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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Donald Rossignol appeals from the district court's order denying post-
conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing on his claims. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Rossignol was convicted after a trial of three counts of lewd conduct with a 
minor, one count of sexual abuse of a child, and being a persistent violator. 
State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 821, 215 P.3d 538, 541 (Ct. App. 2009). On 
appeal the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. kl at 832, 215 P.3d at 552. 
Thereafter Rossignol filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 8-
14.) His claims were that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in 
relation to his decision to not testify (R., pp. 9-10, 78, 126) and for not calling Dan 
J. Schmidt, M.D., as a witness (R., pp. 11-13, 78, 126). (See Tr., p. 5, L. 9- p. 6, 
L. 7.) 
At the evidentiary hearing Rossignol testified that he knew he had the right 
to testify, but believed that his attorney was the one to decide whether he did 
testify. (Tr., p. 13, L. 20 - p. 14, L. 5.) This belief that his attorney would decide 
whether he testified did not arise from anything his attorneys said, and it may 
have come from television. (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 6-15; p. 40, L. 15- p. 41, L. 10.) 
In contrast to Rossignol's testimony, his primary trial attorney testified that 
he always makes sure that the decision of whether or not to testify is made by his 
client, the defendant. (Tr., p. 50, L. 13 - p. 51, L. 20.) In most of his cases 
involving sexual abuse the defendant has in fact testified. (Tr., p. 51, Ls. 6-13.) 
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He advised Rossignol not to testify because impeachment evidence "likely 
devastating to his case," including the fact of a prior forgery conviction and 
evidence that Rossignol had committed perjury in a child protection hearing 
related to the charges in the criminal case, would have been admitted if he had 
testified. (Tr., p. 52, L. 23 - p. 55, L. 1.) Rossignol never insisted that he testify 
(Tr., p. 55, Ls. 2-4) and counsel never told him that he was refusing to allow him 
to testify (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 5-7). Co-counsel also testified that he had concurred in 
the advice that Rossignol not testify in his own behalf. (Tr., p. 66, L. 19 - p. 67, 
L. 7.) Rossignol accepted his attorneys' advice to not testify. (Tr., p. 67, Ls. 8-
22.) If Rossignol had actually requested to testify despite his attorneys' contrary 
advice he would have testified. (Tr., p. 67, L. 23 - p. 68, L. 3.) 
Rossignol also testified that he expected that if he had been called in the 
criminal trial Dr. Schmidt would have testified he was the victim's treating 
pediatrician and saw no signs of sexual abuse. (Tr., p. 25, L. 14 - p. 26, L. 19.) 
Dr. Schmidt, however, did not testify at the post-conviction hearing. (See Tr.) 
The district court denied the request for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 
229-38.) First, the district court found no deficient performance because 
Rossignol in fact waived his right to testify and was not denied the opportunity to 
testify, and further found no prejudice as Rossignol's testimony, due to 
impeachment on the prior felony and evidence that he had already committed 
perjury in testimony related to this case, would not have changed the verdict. 
(R., pp. 233-34.) Second, the court determined that attempting but failing to 
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subpoena Dr. Schmidt (because he was out of town) was deficient performance 
by counsel, but that no prejudice had been proven. (R., pp. 234-38.) 
Rossignol filed a notice of appeal timely from the court's order. (R., pp. 
242-44.) 
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ISSUES 
Rossignol states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rossignol's 
petition for post-conviction relief as he showed by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his counsel was 
ineffective in failing to inform him that it was his decision 
whether to testify, regardless of his attorneys' advice, and 
had he testified, there is a reasonable probability that the 
result of the trial would have been different? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rossignol's 
petition for post-conviction relief as he showed by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to testify and the 
State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
was harmless? 
3. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rossignol's 
petition for post-conviction relief because, had Dr. Schmidt 
testified, there is a reasonable probability that the result of 
the trial would have been different? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Rossignol failed to show clear error in the district court's 
factual determinations that there was neither deficient performance 
nor prejudice arising from trial counsels' actions leading to 
Rossignol's decision to not testify? 
2. Has Rossignol failed to show clear error in the district court's 
determination that Rossignol failed to prove prejudice from 
counsel's failure to accomplish service of a subpoena on Dr. 
Schmidt? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Rossignol Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's Factual 
Determinations That There Was Neither Deficient Performance Nor Prejudice 
Arising From Trial Counsels' Actions Leading To Rossignol's Decision To Not 
Testify 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that trial counsel were neither deficient in 
handling the question of whether Rossignol should testify at trial nor did their 
performance result in any prejudice to Rossignol. (R., pp. 232-34.) On appeal 
Rossignol argues that counsel were deficient and that he was prejudiced, 
contending that he believed that the choice of whether to exercise his right to 
testify belonged to his counsel and not to him. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-15.) The 
district court, however, rejected this same argument below by making contrary 
factual findings. (R., pp. 233-34.) Rossignol has failed to claim, much less 
demonstrate, clear error in the district court's factual findings. Rossignol also 
argues that his counsels' actions deprived him of due process. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 16-17 .) This argument is not preserved and is also directly contrary to the 
district court's factual findings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based. 
I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A 
trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled 
to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. 
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App. 1990). Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only 
if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn 
by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 27 4, 276-77, 
971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all 
matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 
Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Rossignol Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's 
Determination That He Merely Accepted Reasonable Advice From 
Counsel To Not Testify At The Trial 
A petitioner seeking relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
must prove "that his counsel was deficient in his performance and that this 
deficiency resulted in prejudice." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 
1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 
424 (1989)). To establish deficient performance the petitioner must overcome a 
strong presumption that counsel performed within the wide range of professional 
assistance by proving trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, , 247 P.3d 582, 609 
(2010); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634, 718 P.2d 283,286 (1986); Davis v. 
State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To meet this 
burden "requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish 
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prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. 
State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The district court found that Rossignol was aware that he had the right to 
testify in his own defense, but that counsel had, by providing reasonable advice, 
persuaded him to not testify but instead exercise his right to remain silent. 
Stated the district court: 
Mr. Rossignol's [sic] testified that he was never affirmatively 
prevented from testifying. Rather, every time he asked to testify, 
his lawyers advised against it, and he then deferred to their 
judgment. Mr. Rossignol does assert that he only deferred to his 
lawyers because they never told him that he was entitled to make 
the ultimate decision about whether or not he would testify. ... I 
simply do not believe that a man that [sic] has repeatedly shown 
himself to be assertive and intimately involved with his own trial 
strategy, even interrupting his lawyer while his lawyer cross-
examines an opposing witness, would not have asserted his known 
right to testify if he wished to. All of these facts lead me to find that, 
although Mr. Rossignol did ask repeatedly to testify, he was each 
time thereafter convinced by his counsel that he should not testify. 
By thus voluntarily not testifying, Mr. Rossignol was not denied a 
constitutional right, but rather waived his right to testify. 
(R., pp. 233-34.) 
The factual finding that Rossignol acquiesced in his counsel's tactical 
advice to not testify precludes any legal conclusion that counsel's performance 
was deficient or that Rossignol was prejudiced. Failing to advise the defendant 
of his right to testify would constitute deficient performance. United States v. 
Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 13 (3rd Cir. 1995). Likewise, it would constitute deficient 
performance to "nulli"~y] a defendant's right to testify over the defendant's 
7 
protest." kt at 12-13. A defendant who does not testify, however, is presumed 
to have assented to his counsel's tactical decision absent some action to either 
assert the right in court or to notify the court of his counsel's interference with his 
right. Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 639-40 (6th Cir. 2009). Likewise, to 
allow a defendant to invalidate a trial because he abided by his lawyer's sound 
advice would render the process fundamentally unfair. United States v. Martinez, 
883 F.2d 750, 761 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690), vacated on 
other grounds 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Edwards, 
897 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Martinez, 883 F.2d at 760-61) (where 
defendant does not testify and does not express a desire to testify to the court, 
defendant has waived his right to testify; a defendant cannot claim he did not 
waive the right even if he later claims to have been ignorant of it). The district 
court's factual finding that Rossignol, knowing of his right to testify and without 
any active interference with that right, elected to defer to counsel's 
recommendation and not testify, demonstrates a proper waiver of the right and a 
lack of deficient performance or prejudice. 1 
1 The district court's factual rejection of Rossignol's claim that he would have 
testified if informed that he could decide the matter differently than his attorney 
precludes any finding of prejudice. The district court also found no prejudice 
because Rossignol's testimony, after impeachment with evidence of his prior 
conviction for forgery and evidence he had already perjured himself in the related 
child protection proceeding, would not have made a difference in the outcome of 
the trial. (R., p. 234.) The trial court's finding of no prejudice beyond a 
reasonable doubt went far beyond merely finding that Rossignol had failed to 
prove prejudice. (Id.) Because the trial court found far more than what was 
required to reject Rossignol's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the state 
merely incorporates without further argument the district court's findings as to 
what effect Rossignol's testimony would have had on the trial. 
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On appeal Rossignol merely repeats the contention rejected as a matter of 
fact by the district court-that he acquiesced in his trial counsel's advice only 
because he was not told that he could personally exercise his right. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 9-15.) Rossignol asserts that a valid waiver of the right to testify 
"requires the defendant to actually know that he or she has this choice to make" 
(Appellant's brief, p. 11) and to waive his right to testify he had to "understand the 
parameters of that right" (Appellant's brief, p. 13). He throws out these 
assertions without citation to any authority, however, and fails to recognize that 
such claims have almost universally been rejected. Hodge, 579 F.3d at 639 
(waiver of right to testify accomplished through conduct); Martinez, 883 F.2d at 
754-61 (right to testify properly waived by act of not testifying) (and cited cases). 
Indeed, it would be perverse to hold that a defendant can waive his right to 
silence by merely choosing to speak but he cannot waive his right to speak by 
staying silent. See Martinez, 883 F.2d at 756-67. 
Likewise, Rossignol cites no authority for his claim that failing to point out 
that the right to testify is a personal right that may not be waived by counsel 
renders trial counsel's performance deficient or the waiver invalid. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 13-14.) It is telling that Rossignol has been unable to ·find any case 
holding that an attorney who has advised a defendant of a right must also inform 
the client that he is not required to accept the attorney's advice on whether to 
waive or assert that right in order to render effective assistance of counsel. (See 
Appellant's brief.) The district court's factual finding that Rossignol ultimately 
accepted counsel's competent advice to not testify is not disproved by this 
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baseless argument. Because counsel gave sound advice when he advised 
Rossignol to not testify and Rossignol knew he had the right to testify, there was 
neither deficient performance nor prejudice when Rossignol elected to follow his 
counsel's advice. Compare Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(rejecting claim that counsel interfered with right to testify by threatening to "walk 
out on" defendant in middle of trial if he decided to testify because not supported 
by evidence). 
D. Rossignol's Argument That His Counsel Violated His Due Process Rights 
Is Not Properly Before This Court 
Rossignol also asserts that counsels' actions violated his due process 
rights by denying him the right to testify, independent of his Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.) This 
argument fails for several reasons. 
First, it is not preserved. Rossignol asserted only a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (R., pp. 9-10, 78, 126.) On appeal, a party must be held 
to the theory upon which the cause was tried in the lower court. Robinson v. 
Spicer, 86 Idaho 138, 145, 383 P.2d 844, 849 (1963). 2 Because Rossignol 
raised only one claim-of ineffective assistance of counsel-in his pleadings, he 
is barred from asserting two claims-both a claim of ineffective assistance of 
2 The district court addressed this claim as a due process claim. (R., p. 232.) By 
addressing a claim never raised in the petition the district court erred. See 
I.R.C.P. 15(a) (party must seek and obtain permission to amend pleadings). At 
no time did the state consent to an amendment of the pleadings from a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to due process. See I.R.C.P. 15(b). This Court 
can merely exacerbate this error of not granting the state the opportunity to 
present evidence on this unasserted claim by addressing it on appeal. 
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counsel and a claim of an independent due process violation by denial of his right 
to testify on appeal. 
Second, counsel's actions should be reviewed for ineffective assistance of 
counsel under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States 
rather than the dicta in State v. Darb in, 109 Idaho 516, 708 P.2d 921 (Ct. App. 
1985). The Supreme Court of the United States has held that challenges to the 
choices and actions of defense counsel should be analyzed for deficient 
performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
In Darb in the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that there may be an exception to 
Strickland where the actions of counsel result in deprivation of the right to testify, 
but then went on to hold that it could not address the merits of any such claim on 
direct appeal. Darb in, 109 Idaho at 521-23, 708 P .2d at 926-28. The reasoning 
applied in the court's dictum was that because whether a defendant testifies is 
not a tactical decision left to counsel, a claim that counsel deprived the defendant 
of the right to testify should not be reviewed under the standards of Strickland. 
!sL_ Such a distinction has never been applied by the Supreme Court of the 
United States or the Idaho Supreme Court. In fact, such a distinction has been 
implicitly rejected by application of the Strickland standard to counsel's actions in 
relation to guilty pleas, see, ~' Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); 
Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 226 P.3d 1269 (2010), even though the 
decision to enter a guilty plea is clearly not a tactical decision by counsel. 
Holding that the state must prove no prejudice where defendant waived the right 
to testify based upon deficient performance of counsel but that the defendant 
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must prove prejudice where he waived the right to a trial based on deficient 
performance is without logical or legal basis. 
In addition, the rights granted in the Constitution are incorporated by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. .!;Jt, 
McDonald v. Illinois, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3034-35 (2010) 
(incorporating Second Amendment). Thus, the right to testify is a due process 
right that may not be denied by the State of ldaho.3 Finding that the State of 
Idaho did not afford due process because counsel chose not to call his client to 
the stand effectively, and erroneously, makes defense counsel an agent of the 
state. Rather than being an agent of the state, a claim that counsel did not 
adequately protect the due process right to testify is a claim that the state did not 
provide the Sixth Amendment rights guaranteed by the constitution, as are all 
other claims that the actions of counsel ultimately deprived a defendant of his 
rights. There is no legally or logically sound basis for singling out the right to 
testify for exception from the Strickland test when all other claims of a loss of due 
process rights due to the actions of counsel must reviewed under Strickland. 
Finally, even if Strickland did not apply, Rossignol has failed to show error. 
Under Darbin Rossignol had the burden of proving that he was "deprived of the 
3 In Idaho a court has no duty to obtain a waiver of the right to testify on the 
record. State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 912, 908 P.2d 1211, 1219 (1995). 
Applying the rule of Darbin effectively requires that courts obtain an on-record 
waiver. Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 232-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) 
(rejecting argument to apply Chapman harmless error standard in place of 
Strickland standard to claims of violation of right to testify because harmless error 
standard would effectively require district court to conduct its own inquiry to avoid 
claim of error). 
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right to testify." Darbin, 109 Idaho at 522, 708 P.2d at 927 (emphasis added). 
Rossignol was not deprived of his right to testify merely because counsel 
persuaded him that exercise of his right to silence was in his best interest. 
Because the factual findings of the district court show no deprivation of the right 
to testify, Rossignol has failed to show error. 
11. 
Rossignol Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's Determination 
That Rossignol Failed To Prove Preiudice From Counsel's Failure To Accomplish 
Service Of A Subpoena On Dr. Schmidt 
A. Introduction 
The district court found deficient performance in counsel's failure to 
successfully subpoena Dr. Schmidt for the trial but found any deficient 
performance harmless because successful service of the subpoena would not 
have changed the outcome of the trial. (R., pp. 234-38.) Rossignol generally 
claims that the district court erred. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-18.) Rossignol has 
failed to show that the district court's findings or conclusions that he failed to 
prove prejudice are error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based. 
I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A 
trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled 
to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. 
App. 1990). Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of 
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fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only 
if they are clearly erroneous, but will 'freely review the conclusions of law drawn 
by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 
971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all 
matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 
Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Rossignol Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Finding Of 
Lack Of Pre1udice 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner 
must prove a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) 
(citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 312, 955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998)). '"A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."' McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694)). "It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel's errors must be so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Harrington 
v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787-88 (2011) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Meeting this "high bar is never an easy task." ~ 
Rossignol attempted to meet his high bar of showing that the absence of 
Dr. Schmidt's testimony made the jury's finding of guilt unreliable without actually 
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presenting the testimony of Dr. Schmidt. (See Tr.) Without presenting the actual 
testimony of Dr. Schmidt, Rossignol did not prove the testimony of Dr. Schmidt 
would likely have changed the outcome of the trial. 
Even if this Court merely assumes that Dr. Schmidt would have testified 
consistently with the representations made by Rossignol and his trial counsel, 
Rossignol utterly failed in his burden of proof. The testimony would ostensibly 
have been that Dr. Schmidt saw the victim "approximately a dozen times," always 
accompanied by Rossignol or both Rossignol and his wife. (Tr., p. 24, L. 15 - p. 
25, L. 13.) He saw the victim for "check-ups," "sore throats," "colds," and 
"inflamed tonsils and adenoids." (Tr., p. 25, L. 14 - p. 26, L 1.) Rossignol 
expected him to testify that he saw no signs of sexual abuse. (Tr., p. 26, Ls. 2-
19; see also p. 61, L. 18 - p. 62, L. 12.) In short, Rossignol presented no 
evidence that Dr. Schmidt was in a better position to know whether sexual abuse 
was occurring than any person who had contact with the victim on about a dozen 
occasions in over a year. Again, even making the assumption that Dr. Schmidt 
would have testified as Rossignol believed he would, Rossignol has failed to 
show error in the district court's determination that Rossignol had failed to prove 
that Dr. Schmidt's anticipated testimony would likely have changed the outcome 
of the trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the order denying post-
conviction relief. 
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